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Subverting Democracy to Save Democracy:




Nearly a decade after the first Twitter and Facebook revolutions, the early
narratives pointing to social media as a great agent of democratization1 have
given way to a more nuanced understanding of the impact of the Internet on our
political discourse. While there is no question that Internet access provides
tremendous expressive benefits,2 scholars are increasingly questioning whether
this information diet is ultimately healthy for society. An analogy to sugars, fats
and salts has emerged, where just as an appetite for rich foods served our species
well when resources were scarce, but have become a liability in an age of plenty,
our natural curiosity and hunger for new ideas has led to problems in an online
world teeming with misinformation and extremism.3 The potential for mischief
was illustrated in stark terms in 2016, when well documented campaigns of
foreign interference, including social media manipulation, impacted both the
Brexit referendum and the United States presidential race.4
In response to these, and other high profile cases of the Internet being used as
a vector to distribute manipulative content,5 many countries around the world
are re-examining their approach to regulating online speech, as well as their
specific posture on election speech.6 However, while there is no question that the
Internet has created a raft of new regulatory challenges, it is important not to
* Michael Karanicolas, Wikimedia Fellow, Information Society Project, Yale Law
School. Sincere thanks to David Lepofsky,MatthewMarinett, and Jack Enman-Beech,
all of whom offered very helpful feedback in revising this paper.
1 See e.g. Philip N. Howard & Muzammil M. Hussain, ‘‘The Upheavals in Egypt and
Tunisia: The Role of Digital Media” (2011) 22:3 J. Democracy 35.
2 See e.g. Michael Karanicolas, ‘‘Understanding the Internet as a Human Right” (2012)
10:2 C.J.L.T. 129.
3 Zeynep Tufekci, ‘‘YouTube, the Great Radicalizer” New York Times (10 March 2018),
online: <www.nytimes.com/2018/03/10/opinion/sunday/youtube-politics-radi-
cal.html>.
4 Ewan McGaughey, ‘‘Could Brexit be Void?” (2018) 29:3 King’s LJ 331. Jens David
Ohlin, ‘‘Did Russian Cyber Interference in the 2016 Election Violate International
Law?” (2017) 95:7 Tex. L. Rev. 1579.
5 Samantha Bradshaw & Philip N. Howard, ‘‘Challenging Truth and Trust: A Global
Inventory of Organized Social Media Manipulation” Computational Propaganda
Research Project Working Paper (20 July 2018), online: <comprop.oii.ox.ac.uk/
research/cybertroops2018/>.
[17 C.J.L.T.]
lose sight of the foundational importance of freedom of expression to an effective
democracy. Solutions which attempt to address the challenges posed by online
speech, but which do this by undermining core freedom of expression principles,
are ultimately destined to be counter-productive. Any victory against forces that
threaten our democracy will be hollow if it comes at the cost of the human rights
principles which undergird our democratic system.
This paper considers Canada’s responses to the spread of online
misinformation in an electoral context, particularly through updated
provisions in the Canada Elections Act,7 and through a recent push to
‘‘jawbone”8 online platforms into taking proactive measures to stem the flow
of problematic speech, arguing that both of these raise substantial freedom of
expression concerns, and that efforts to sidestep key constitutional questions
around the appropriate scope of restrictions on political speech may ultimately
pose a greater threat to Canadian democracy than online misinformation.
The paper begins by introducing the political impact of the Internet, both as
a force for democratization, and ultimately as a vector for the spread of harmful
speech and misinformation. It will then discuss the reforms in the Elections
Modernization Act, which target misinformation,9 placing these changes in the
context of relevant Supreme Court jurisprudence to argue that the new
provisions raise serious constitutional questions, which the government has
declined to properly address. The paper will then discuss the latest attempts by
the federal government, in collaboration with other countries, to push private
platforms into acting aggressively against constitutionally protected speech, an
approach which evades constitutional questions around the appropriate limits of
regulation in this space. The paper ultimately argues that, although the threats
from harmful online speech are real enough, solutions which sidestep core
Charter questions are far more problematic from the perspective of Canadian
democracy, and that the public would be best served by a return to core legal and
constitutional approaches to regulating speech.
2. THE INTERNET’S IMPACT ON THE POLITICAL DISCOURSE
A. The Internet as a Force for Democratic Engagement
The Internet has substantially transformed the right to freedom of
expression, and in many countries, is in the process of transforming
democracy itself. This potential was noted as early as 1999 by the Inter-
6 See e.g. Michael Head, ‘‘Australia’s Anti-Democratic ’Foreign Interference’ Bills”
(2018) 43:3 Alternative L.J. 160.
7 Canada Elections Act, S.C. 2000, c. 9, s. 91.
8 Derek E. Bambauer, ‘‘Against Jawboning” (2015) 100 Minn. L. Rev. 51 at 57.
9 Bill C-76, An Act to amend the Canada Elections Act and other Acts and to make certain
consequential amendments, 1st Sess., 42nd Parl., 2018, s. 61.
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American Commission on Human Rights, in words which, over the following
decades, have proven prescient:
[The Internet] is a mechanism capable of strengthening the democratic
system, contributing towards the economic development of the
countries of the region, and strengthening the full exercise of freedom
of expression. Internet is an unprecedented technology in the history of
communications that facilitates rapid transmission and access to a
multiple and varied universal data network, maximizes the active
participation of citizens through Internet use, contributes to the full
political, social, cultural and economic development of nations, thereby
strengthening democratic society.10
In considering the impact of the Internet on democracy, it is useful to
consider three main changes that have accompanied the spread of Internet
access. First, the Internet has changed our relationship to information, by
placing almost the entirety of human knowledge at our fingertips to access,
immediately and wherever we happen to be. While there are debates as to
whether or not access to this knowledge actually makes us smarter,11 it has led to
substantial changes in our attitude towards information, and an emerging
expectation that information of public relevance should be available and
accessible.12 It is telling that the notion of a public right of access to government
information spread around the world at the same time as the rise of the Internet.
114 of the 127 countries in the world which passed right to information or access
to information legislation did so after 1990 (90%), and 95 of them (75%) were
passed after 2000.13 From the perspective of political engagement, the fact that
people have access to such enormous volumes of information is a good thing.
Democracies rely on citizens to guide public decision making on key issues,
which in turn assumes a baseline level of awareness of the background and
context behind these decisions. A better-informed electorate creates a healthier
democracy.
Second, the Internet has dramatically enhanced the power of what ordinary
people are able to say, including their ability to communicate their ideas widely
without spending much money or even leaving their home. Unlike previous
forms of mass communication, such as broadcasting, which only facilitated the
10 OAS, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 104th Sess., Report for the
Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.106 (2000), online:
<www.summit-americas.org/Human%20Rights/Freedom-Expression-1999.htm>.
11 See e.g. Nicholas G. Carr, The Shallows: What the Internet Is Doing to Our Brains (New
York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2010).
12 One manifestation of this is the rise of the open data movement: Timothy H. Parker,
Shinichi Nakagawa and Jessica Gurevtich, ‘‘Open Data: Towards Full Transparency”
(2016) 538:7626 Nature 459; Judie Attard et al., ‘‘A Systematic Review of Open
Government Data Initiatives” (2015) 32:4 Government Information Q. 399.
13 As charted on the Global Right to Information Rating: Centre for Law andDemocracy
and Access Info Europe, Country Data, online: <www.rti-rating.org/country-data/>.
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ability of an influential few to communicate widely, the Internet gives everybody
a platform, and potentially a global audience.14 In addition to empowering
ordinary users, this change has had an impact on information flows, as
decentralized person-to-person networks are displacing the traditional hub-and-
spoke model, where the population depended on a relatively small number of
media outlets to gather and distribute the news. Although journalists remain an
influential and important part of the news ecosystem, their industry has come
under intense pressure as a result of the spread of the Internet. In 1990,
approximately 455,000 people worked in the news business in the United
States.15 By 2016 that number shrunk by more than half to 183,200 employees.16
A third major impact to consider relates to how we engage with one another.
It has been widely recognized that the Internet has a strong disinhibiting effect,
enabling people to say things online that they would never express in a personal
interaction.17 There are well-documented toxic aspects of this, including the
propagation of hate speech, threats and abuse.18 However, there are also positive
aspects to this disinhibition, particularly from the perspective of political
engagement, as it allows people to express unpopular or controversial views
without fear of social pressure, something that is of fundamental value in a
democracy. In particular, online speech allows people to challenge powerful
leaders directly in a way that would have been unimaginable before the
Internet.19 At least in part, this is facilitated by the facelessness and anonymity
that accompanies digital communication. As a result, the nexus between
anonymity and freedom of expression is becoming increasingly recognized,
including by the Council of Europe20 and by the United Nations Special
Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression.21
14 Michael Karanicolas et al., Stand Up for Digital Rights: Recommendations for
Responsible Tech (Halifax: Centre for Law and Democracy, 2016) at 26, online:
<responsible-tech.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Intermediaries-Print.pdf>.
15 U.S., Department of Labor, The Economics Daily, Employment trends in newspaper




17 John Suler, ‘‘TheOnline Disinhibition Effect” (2005) 2:2 Intl. J. Applied Psychoanalytic
Stud. 184.
18 James Banks, ‘‘RegulatingHate SpeechOnline” (2010) 24:3 Intl. Rev. L. Comp.&Tech.
233.
19 See e.g. Chelsea Bailey, ‘‘Woman’s Epic Anti-Trump Twitter Rant Goes Viral” NBC
News (4 December 2016), online: <www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/woman-s-epic-
anti-trump-twitter-rant-goes-viral-n691736>.
20 Council of Europe, Committee of Ministers, 840th meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies,
Declaration on freedom of communication on the Internet (2003), online: Organization for
Security and Co-operation in Europe <www.osce.org/fom/31507?download=true>.
21 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of
opinion and expression,UNHRC, 23rd Sess.,U.N.Doc.A/HRC/23/40 (2013) at para. 79,
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B. The Internet as a Challenge to Democracy
The flipside of these expressive benefits are the challenges which the Internet,
and in particular social media, can pose to the electoral process. One prominent
aspect of this, which was referenced by the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v.
Bryan, is the growing difficulty enforcing laws governing digital speech.22 There
are a number of factors for this, including the transnational nature of the
Internet, which leads to jurisdictional challenges in enforcement, as well as
difficulties tying online speech to a person’s offline identity.23
A second challenge comes from the transmission of misinformation,
particularly as a result of social media’s tendency to spread more salacious or
inflammatory material faster than more mundane facts.24 This is partly
attributed to our own biases, but is also a consequence of how major social
media platforms, like Twitter and Facebook, structure their algorithms,
rewarding and promoting engagement and entertainment value rather than
accuracy.25 Jonathan Swift’s old adage that, ‘‘Falsehood flies, and the truth
comes limping after it,” has now been coded directly into the systems that guide
our political discourse.26
Both of these factors contribute to the Internet’s potential as a vector for
foreign election interference. The anonymity that is inherent in the online
discourse, along with the ease of creating fake digital ‘‘speakers,” facilitates mass
infiltration into a country’s domestic political dialogue.27 The tendency of social
media platforms to create ‘‘echo chambers” of likeminded users, who may be
particularly predisposed to believing a rumour which corresponds to their
political biases, further facilitates the deliberate spreading of misinformation.28
One other challenge which flows from the nature of online communications,
as well as their potential for advanced data gathering, is the rise of
microtargeting which, in a political context, translates to micro-campaigning,
where politicians can personalize their message to particular demographics, and
online: <www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/RegularSession/Ses-
sion23/A.HRC.23.40_EN.pdf>.
22 R. v. Bryan, 2007 SCC 12, 2007 CarswellBC 533, 2007 CarswellBC 534 (S.C.C.).
23 AlexMills, ‘‘The LawApplicable to Cross-Border Defamation on SocialMedia:Whose
Law Governs Free Speech in ‘Facebookistan’?” (2015) 7:1 J. Media L. 1.
24 Soroush Vosoughi, Deb Roy & Sinan Aral, ‘‘The sSpread of True and False News
Online” (2018) 359:6380 Science 1146.
25 Zeynep Tufekci, ‘‘The Real Bias Built In at Facebook” New York Times (19May 2016),
online: <www.nytimes.com/2016/05/19/opinion/the-real-bias-built-in-at-face-
book.html>.
26 Jonathan Swift, ‘‘Political Lying” The Examiner No. XIV. (November 9, 1710), online:
<www.bartleby.com/209/633.html>.
27 Chengcheng Shao et al., ‘‘The Spread of Low-Credibility Content by Social Bots” (2018)
9:4787 Nature Communications 1.
28 Michela Del Vicarioa et al., ‘‘The Spreading of Misinformation Online” (2016) 113:3
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 554.
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even say contradictory things to different groups. For example, a politician
might assume anti-abortion positions in ads shown to religious voters, while
understating or even reversing that position in ads that are being delivered to
secular voters. In a pre-Internet age, a politician offering contradictory messages
in different television or radio ads, or at different campaign rallies, would be easy
to track and to publicly call out. In the social media space, a candidate’s
messaging is far more difficult to follow, given that thousands of ads may be
generated to show to different precise demographics, with only the platform
having access to the totality of any candidate’s message.
3. THE CANADA ELECTIONS ACT AND MISINFORMATION
In a democratic society, political speech, and in particular speech around
elections, cuts to the core of freedom of expression guarantees.29 This is true not
only as an established matter of Canadian jurisprudence, but in line with global
human rights standards, which hold that the highest level of protection must be
accorded to the communication of information and ideas about political issues.30
None of this is to suggest that elections should be a free-fire zone, where all limits
or regulations impacting speech are abrogated. Indeed, it is not unusual for
elections to give rise to additional speech restrictions, such as limits around how
much money a particular entity may spend on advertising connected to the
ongoing political process.31 But in general, restrictions on election speech bear a
significant burden of justification, including demonstrating that they are
appropriately targeted and proportional.
Recent years have seen a number of calls to modernize our election laws,
including as a result of documented online interferences elsewhere.32 Canada’s
Chief Electoral Officer issued a report with a number of recommendations in
2016,33 which fed into a Senate report on the subject in 2017.34 Both of these
documents ultimately contributed to the development of the Elections
Modernization Act, which received Royal Assent on 13 December 2018, and
29 See e.g.Harper v.Canada (AttorneyGeneral), 2004 SCC33, 2004CarswellAlta 646, 2004
CarswellAlta 647 (S.C.C.) at paras. 1, 66.
30 General Comment No. 34: Article 19 (Freedoms of opinion and expression), U.N.H.R.C.,
102nd Sess., U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GC/34 (2011) at para. 20.
31 Canada Elections Act, supra note 7 at s. 350.
32 See e.g. Henry Farrell & Bruce Schneier, ‘‘Common-Knowledge Attacks on Democ-
racy” (17November 2018), 2018:7 BerkmanKlein Center for Internet & Society, online:
<papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3273111>.
33 Canada, Office of the Chief Electoral Officer, An Electoral Framework for the 21st
Century (Ottawa: OCEO, 2016), online: <www.elections.ca/res/rep/off/rec_2016/
rec2016_e.pdf>.
34 Canada, Standing Senate Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, Controlling
Foreign Influence in Canadian Elections, 1st Sess., 42nd Parl. (June 2017), online:
<sencanada.ca/content/sen/committee/421/LCJC/reports/Election_Report_FINA-
L_e.pdf>.
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which includes substantial revisions to Canada’s approach to election speech.35
Although a narrative has developed which paints these changes as relatively
cautious,36 there are serious constitutional questions arising from the reforms
related to misinformation (or ‘‘fake news”) which have, thus far, flown under the
public and academic radar.37 In particular, the reforms strip away important
procedural safeguards, including any requirement that the speaker needs to know
that their statement is false in order to be charged with an offence.
The previous iteration of the Canada Elections Act included language which
barred people from making ‘‘any false statement of fact in relation to the
personal character or conduct of a candidate or prospective candidate,”
knowingly and with the intention of affecting the results of an election.38 A
citation search via Westlaw suggests that nobody has ever been charged under
this provision. As a result of the Elections Modernization Act, the Canada
Elections Act has been modified to read as follows:
91(1) No person or entity shall, with the intention of affecting the
results of an election, make or publish, during the election period,
(a) a false statement that a candidate, a prospective candidate, the
leader of a political party or a public figure associated with a
political party has committed an offence under an Act of
Parliament or a regulation made under such an Act — or under
an Act of the legislature of a province or a regulation made under
such an Act — or has been charged with or is under investigation
for such an offence; or
(b) a false statement about the citizenship, place of birth,
education, professional qualifications or membership in a group
or association of a candidate, a prospective candidate, the leader of
a political party or a public figure associated with a political party.
(2) Subsection (1) applies regardless of the place where the election is
held or the place where the false statement is made or published.39
In addition to removing the requirement that false statements be made
‘‘knowingly,” the revised language expands the class of persons protected from
35 Bill C-76, An Act to amend the Canada Elections Act and other Acts and to make certain
consequential amendments, 1st Sess, 42nd Parl, 2018.
36 Michael Pal, of the University of Ottawa Faculty of Law, is one prominent voice
supporting this perspective, as quoted in Aaron Wherry, ‘‘Could the Liberals’ Election
Law Reform Throw a Leash on the ‘Permanent Campaign’?” CBC News (5 May 2018),
online: <www.cbc.ca/news/politics/liberals-election-campaign-c76-analysis-wherry-
1.4647180>.
37 After this Article completed peer review, a Calgary-based NGO, the Canadian
Constitution Foundation, announced that it was launching a Charter challenge against
the revised provisions.
38 Canada Elections Act, supra note 7 at ss. 91-92, 281(a).
39 Bill C-76, supra note 9 at s. 61.
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such false statements to include leaders of political parties and public figures
associated with a political party, in addition to candidates and prospective
candidates. This is potentially an extremely broad category of persons,
depending on how ‘‘associated with” is interpreted.
The revised language appears to be less open-ended in terms of the subject
matter of the statements, since it introduces a set of factual categories, such as
misstatements about the subject’s professional qualifications or citizenship.
However, some of these categories are quite nebulous. For example, it is unclear
whether ‘‘professional qualifications” is limited to formal accreditations, such as
one’s membership status in a relevant Barristers’ Society or Law Society, or more
general qualifications for elected office. The subjectivity of the latter category
means that it could include biographical details like how long the candidate has
lived in the riding, or their broader personal achievements. Similarly,
‘‘membership in a group or association” is also open to interpretation. A
narrow view would restrict this to formally incorporated entities, such as, for
example, erroneously claiming that a candidate was a member of the Hells
Angels Motorcycle Club. However, a broader interpretation could include
everything from claiming a candidate is a member of a particular religious
denomination, to claiming they are a part of some loosely defined political
movement (like calling someone a socialist or a member of the alt-right), to
saying they are a vegetarian. Clarity and specificity are of cardinal importance
for any regulation impacting freedom of expression, and international standards
hold that this kind of flexibility in interpreting the scope of prohibited speech can
be problematic.40
The changes also extend the ambit of s. 91 to cover entities that make
statements, in addition to individuals, and it now applies without regard to where
the false statement is made or published. However, it also only applies during the
election period, which narrows the potential scope of prohibited conduct
significantly.
In addition to reforms related to misinformation, the Elections
Modernization Act contains a number of other provisions aimed at boosting
election integrity, including new transparency requirements. In particular,
platforms which sell advertising space to ‘‘political actors,” as defined under
the law, will now be required to publish a full registry of the advertising messages
posted by these actors during the election and pre-election periods, making it
easier to obtain a global understanding of the nature of messaging being pushed
by various political actors.41
40 General Comment No. 34: Article 19 (Freedoms of opinion and expression), supra note 30
at para. 25.
41 Bill C-76, supra note 9 at s. 208.1.
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4. RELEVANT CASE LAW
A. Zundel and Criminalizing Misinformation
The fact that nobody has ever been charged under s. 91 of the Canada
Elections Act makes it difficult to definitively assess the scope and
constitutionality of the reforms. However, leading jurisprudence on the issue
of misinformation generally suggests that the government would have a difficult
time defending the provisions, as amended.
The most relevant case in dealing with misinformation, R. v. Zundel, was
decided in 1992.42 Here, the Supreme Court of Canada struck down a
misinformation provision in the Criminal Code, which prohibited the wilful
publication of a statement or news that the person knows is false and that
‘‘causes or is likely to cause injury or mischief to a public interest.”43 In finding
that the provision violated s. 2(b) of the Charter, the majority focused on the
breadth of the prohibition, which could potentially apply beyond matters of
‘‘pure fact,” and that the phrase ‘‘injury or mischief to a public interest” was
problematically vague. The majority also pointed to the lack of a modern social
problem or pressing concern which it was meant to address, noting that the Law
Reform Commission of Canada had labelled the provision ‘‘anachronistic.”44
The Supreme Court also noted that no other free and democratic country had
similar legislation in force.45
The dissent, by contrast, focused on the substantial intent requirement to
find that it was a justifiable limitation in line with s. 1, since an offender would
have to publish a statement knowing that it was false, a high evidentiary hurdle
to overcome. They also read ‘‘public interest” as being confined to Charter
rights, though they focused on racism as the harm to be combated, and the
notion that s. 181 was necessary to protect vulnerable minority groups, drawing
from the fact that the defendant in this case had been charged as a result of
distributing material which denied the Holocaust.
B. Other Decisions on Regulating Content During Elections
Although Zundel is the most thematically relevant case in considering the
misinformation provisions in the Canada Elections Act, it is also instructive to
consider two other cases, which help to flesh out the Supreme Court’s approach
to regulating speech during elections. In R. v. Bryan, the Court followed a
strongly egalitarian model of election fairness to uphold the constitutionality of a
law that prohibited the transmission of election results between one electoral
district and another before polls had closed in the latter.46 This provision was
42 R. v. Zundel, 1992 CarswellOnt 109, 1992 CarswellOnt 995, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 731 (S.C.C.).
43 Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 181.
44 Zundel, supra note 42.
45 Ibid.
46 Bryan, supra note 22.
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deliberately challenged during the 2000 federal election by the defendant, who
posted the results from Atlantic Canada online.47
The majority, which consisted of two concurring opinions by Justice
Bastarache and Justice Fish, upheld the constitutionality of the law, mainly on
the basis of the need to promote informational equality across the country, since
it would be unfair for voters in western Canada to have access to information
that was unavailable to voters in the Atlantic provinces.48 Public perceptions of
electoral fairness played a key role, with Justice Bastarache noting that this was
‘‘a vital element in the value of the system.”49
The dissent, on the other hand, while accepting ‘‘unequivocally” that public
perceptions of fairness were a pressing and substantial objective,50 focused in
part on the fact that the publication ban had been ‘‘rendered obsolete” as a result
of advances in technology.51 This, they reasoned, impacted the balancing by
undermining any actual useful effects from the publication ban itself. The
majority was split on the principle that obsolescence was a significant factor for
consideration. Justice Bastarache explicitly rejected this line of thinking, stating
that ‘‘perfect enforcement is not a requirement of a law’s validity,” though he
also noted that the prohibition was still fulfilling its objective by reducing the
availability of this information, even if it did not block access to it altogether.52
Justice Fish, on the other hand, did not explicitly reject the relevance of
obsolescence to the balancing analysis, instead disagreeing with the degree to
which the prohibition had in fact been rendered ineffective, since it ‘‘does, at the
very least, curb widespread dissemination of this information and it contributes
materially in this way to its objective.”53
In another leading Supreme Court case on content regulation around
elections, Thomson Newspapers Co. v. Canada (Attorney General), the majority
adopted a substantially different approach.54 This case involved a challenge to s.
322.1 of the Canada Elections Act which, at the time, prohibited the
broadcasting, publication or dissemination of opinion survey results during the
final three days of a federal election campaign, on the grounds that inaccurate
polls published so close to the election would have the potential to mislead
47 Ibid. at para. 2. It is worth noting that these election night blackout provisions were
ultimately repealed with Bill C-23, An Act to amend the Canada Elections Act and other
Acts and tomake consequential amendments to certain Acts (the ‘‘Fair Elections Act”), 2nd
Sess., 41st Parl., 2014.
48 Bryan, supra note 22 at paras. 35, 62.
49 Ibid. at para. 62. Justice Fish, in his concurring opinion, expressed a similar sentiment at
para. 25.
50 Ibid. at para. 118.
51 Ibid. at para. 123.
52 Ibid. at para. 40.
53 Ibid. at para. 79.
54 Thomson Newspapers Co. v. Canada (Attorney General), 1998 CarswellOnt 1981, 1998
CarswellOnt 1982, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 877 (S.C.C.).
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voters, since there would be no time to correct the record before people voted.
The majority opted to strike down the legislation mainly due to skepticism as to
the likelihood of harm from inaccurate polling,55 though they also took issue
with Parliament’s decision to prohibit publishing polls altogether, arguing that
requiring the publication of methodological information alongside polls would
have been less intrusive and more effective.56
In arriving at these findings, the majority placed significant stock in the
‘‘maturity and intelligence”57 of Canadian voters: ‘‘The presumption in this
Court should be that the Canadian voter is a rational actor who can learn from
experience and make independent judgments about the value of particular
sources of electoral information.”58 The majority also rejected arguments,
presented by the government, that other democratic countries had passed similar
prohibitions, holding that the varying social and legal contexts meant that these
arguments should not be accorded great weight in the absence of ‘‘some
consensus in the international context, or of evidence explaining why the
provisions adopted in some other free and democratic countries are compelling
given the situation in Canada.” 59 In distinguishing this case from rules around
election spending, the majority pointed out that paid political advertising was, by
design, manipulative, whereas pollsters had an incentive to maintain a
reputation for nonpartisan accuracy.60
The dissent adopted a more deferential stance, arguing that ‘‘Parliament is
not bound to find the least intrusive nor the best means.”61 The dissent also
adopted a more explicitly egalitarian tone: ‘‘the democratic process cares about
each voter and should not tolerate the fact that, in the polling booth, some voters
would express themselves on the basis of misleading, or potentially misleading,
information that is de facto immunized from scrutiny and criticism.”62 This
heavy focus on egalitarianism is consistent with the approach in Harper v.
Canada (Attorney General), Canada’s leading case on election spending limits, in
which the Supreme Court focused on the ability of citizens to meaningfully
participate, backed by legislative controls appropriate to guarantee this
participation.63
However, in contrast to the decisions in Harper and Bryan, which
emphasized the importance of political speech to freedom of expression, and
the concomitant general interest in a light regulatory touch, the dissent in
55 Ibid. at paras. 108, 113.
56 Ibid. at para. 119.
57 Ibid. at para. 101.
58 Ibid. at para. 112.
59 Ibid. at para. 121.
60 Ibid. at para. 114.
61 Ibid. at para. 43.
62 Ibid. at para. 40.
63 Harper, supra note 29 at para. 107.
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Thomson seemed to imply that the importance of elections might actually justify
a stronger regulatory hand:
[Canada’s restrictions on election speech] are strong evidence that
elections constitute, in our society, a unique event which calls for
special treatment in order to promote voter autonomy and rational
choice. Modern Canadian electoral law has sought to curb the excesses,
enhance the democratic process and enable the voter to make a rational
choice.64
5. CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO REGULATING
MISINFORMATION DURING ELECTIONS
In assessing the constitutional status of the revised s. 91 of the Canada
Elections Act, there are a few factors that might point in the government’s
favour. First, a central concern of the Court in Zundel was the fact that the
provision could apply beyond matters of pure fact, which does not apply to the
misinformation provisions in the Elections Modernization Act. It might also be
helpful that s. 91 is directly targeted towards the harm of misleading the public
during an election, as compared to the impugned Criminal Code provisions
which protected against the vaguely defined ‘‘injury or mischief to a public
interest.”65 The targeted harm is further magnified by the potential for
manipulation. This was a key point in Thomson Newspapers Co., where the
majority noted that journalists and polling firms do not overtly seek to
manipulate public sentiment.66 Clearly, with online disinformation campaigns,
there is a different dynamic at work. There is a wealth of data that has been
published over the past two years on the harms and potential for manipulation
flowing from disinformation online.67 This threat is further exacerbated by the
potential for microtargeting that accompanies digital advertising, and the ability
to tailor disinformation in a manner which specifically strikes at the latent biases
or concerns of individual recipients.
While these factors may help to support a stronger regulatory standard,
particularly against organized disinformation campaigns, the Canada Elections
Act, as revised, makes no distinction between an organized disinformation
campaign and a journalist, or even a casual social media user, making an honest
mistake. A key aspect of Zundel, which the dissent cited in arguing that s. 181
was justified, was the substantial intent component, which required the
defendant to know that the statement they were making was false. As noted
earlier, the Canada Elections Act no longer requires this. Although it does require
the statement to be made ‘‘with the intention of affecting the results of an
64 Thomson Newspapers, supra note 54 at para. 18.
65 Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 181.
66 Thomson Newspapers, supra note 54 at para. 114.
67 See e.g. David M. J. Lazer et al., ‘‘The Science of Fake News” (2018) 359:6380 Science
1094.
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election,” this is potentially a much lower standard, since every public statement
about a candidate made in the course of an election might be said to be an
attempt to influence the results, even if made in a non-partisan way.
An additional troubling aspect of the revised language in s. 91 is that it does
not incorporate any possible defence for responsible journalism, as was read into
the defamation laws in Grant v. Torstar Corp.68 There is also no exception for
satire or parody. The fact that these exceptions are built into the revised s. 481(1)
of the Canada Elections Act, which prohibits impersonating certain officials and
candidates, suggests that this was a deliberate choice, rather than merely an
oversight.69
Another important aspect to consider is the degree to which s. 91 has any
serious potential to be effective in combating organized disinformation threats,
especially of the type which took place in the United States and the United
Kingdom in 2016. Presumably, the amendments in s. 91(2), which extend the law
to apply cross-jurisdictionally, are a nod to the international nature of these
attacks. However, it is incredibly unlikely that this law could, in practical terms,
be used to apprehend, or even meaningfully deter, State-sponsored actors, who
would be unlikely to stray within the jurisdiction of Canadian law enforcement.
An indictment in the United States of Russian intelligence officers in connection
with the 2016 election interference was controversial among the legal community,
partly because there is a very low likelihood that it will actually result in a
prosecution.70 Given the broader challenges in enforcing content restrictions
online, the fact that the principal actors in organized disinformation campaigns
are likely beyond the reach of this law could also work against it in a
constitutional challenge.
Nor can it be said that there is an ‘‘international consensus” in favour of
regulating misinformation as a result of the growing international concern over
disinformation attacks. In France, which struggled with its own foreign
interferences in the 2017 presidential election,71 the parliament passed a law in
November 2018 which, among other things, grants judges the power to order the
removal of incorrect or misleading information which is likely to bias elections,
and gives broadcasting authorities the power to suspend television channels
under the influence of a foreign state if they deliberately spread false information
likely to impact an election.72 However, France is an exception. Despite the
68 2009 SCC 61, 2009 CarswellOnt 7956, 2009 CarswellOnt 7957 (S.C.C.).
69 Bill C-76, supra note 9 at s. 323.
70 See e.g. Jack Goldsmith, ‘‘The Downsides of Mueller’s Russia Indictment” Lawfare (19
February 2018), online: <www.lawfareblog.com/downsides-muellers-russia-indict-
ment>.
71 Jean-Baptiste Jeangène Vilmer et al., Information Manipulation: A Challenge for Our
Democracies (Paris: Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs & Ministry of the Armed
Forces, Republic of France, 2018), online: <www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/
information_manipulation_rvb_cle838736.pdf>.
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resurgent interest in this issue, comparatively few Western democracies have laws
targeting misinformation.73
In Harper, the Supreme Court held that the right to political participation
‘‘includes a citizen’s right to exercise his or her vote in an informed manner.”74 In
considering the constitutionality of s. 91, this principle needs to be assessed in the
context of the core presumption of the Canadian electorate’s ‘‘maturity and
intelligence,”75 as the potential for voters to be led astray by misinformation,
including deliberately manipulative falsehoods, is weighed against the right of
Canadians to make their own judgments about the value of particular sources of
information. The fact that the Elections Modernization Act includes parallel
transparency provisions which aim to help the public to be more vigilant in
assessing sources of information could further undermine the argument for why
specific sanctions for false information are also necessary.
In Thomson, the majority expressed that their preferred solution was to allow
late polls, but to require that they publish their data.76 This is despite the
challenges many Canadians would face in critically assessing these
methodologies. Just as the old adage holds that ‘‘sunlight is the best
disinfectant,” it seems more in line with the Court’s broader exhortations to
respect the wisdom and maturity of the Canadian electorate to arm them with the
tools to know the difference between truth and fiction, and let them decide for
themselves what to believe.
None of this is to suggest that a constitutional challenge would be a foregone
conclusion, particularly since there is a strong argument that, with the advent of
organized online disinformation campaigns as a vector for foreign election
interference, the threat that ‘‘fake news” poses has grown substantially since
Zundel. However, given the fact that Canada’s leading misinformation case
resulted in the legislation being invalidated, and the Court’s traditional resistance
to parochial mechanisms of controlling the democratic process, it seems very
curious that these issues were not prominently discussed during the rollout of the
Elections Modernization Act. Indeed, the provisions impacting false information
are not even mentioned in the ‘‘Charter Statement” prepared by the Ministry of
Justice to accompany the legislative reform package.77 This is not to suggest that
the government was deliberately seeking to slip these changes in under the radar.
But the decision to not address the constitutional questions around a provision
72 Loi relative à la lutte contre la manipulation de l’information, JO, 24 December 2018, no
0297.
73 Sheldon Burshtein, ‘‘The True Story on Fake News” (2017) 29:3 I.P.J. 397.
74 Harper, supra note 29 at para. 71.
75 Thomson Newspapers, supra note 54 at para. 101.
76 Ibid. at para. 119.
77 Canada,Ministry of Justice, Charter Statement - Bill C-76: An Act to amend the Canada
Elections Act and Other Acts and to make certain consequential amendments (Ottawa:
Ministry of Justice, 2018), online: <www.justice.gc.ca/eng/csj-sjc/pl/charter-charte/
c76.html>.
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directly regulating a matter as sensitive as election speech is nonetheless a curious
one, which leaves substantial constitutional issues with the new legislation
unresolved.
6. BEYOND LEGISLATION: JAWBONING AS A REGULATORY
RESPONSE
A. Laundering Censorship
Among the most important distinguishing factors with regards to online
speech is the role that private sector intermediaries, including platforms like
Facebook and YouTube, play in providing access to, managing, facilitating and
mediating online speech.78 There are a number of factors underlying this,
including the sophisticated technical and infrastructural requirements involved in
communicating online, and the trans-national nature of online speech. The
challenges inherent to promoting human rights in a context where private sector
actors hold so much influence was raised in 2011 by the United Nations Special
Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion
and expression, in a Report addressing freedom of expression on the Internet:
Given that Internet services are run and maintained by private
companies, the private sector has gained unprecedented influence over
individuals’ right to freedom of expression and access to information.
Generally, companies have played an extremely positive role in
facilitating the exercise of the right to freedom of opinion and
expression. At the same time, given the pressure exerted upon them
by States, coupled with the fact that their primary motive is to generate
profit rather than to respect human rights, preventing the private sector
from assisting or being complicit in human rights violations of States is
essential to guarantee the right to freedom of expression.79
Beginning in the early days of the commercial Internet, policymakers realized
that the commercial and social potential of this new medium could best be
achieved if service providers were protected against direct liability for the words
of their users. This idea led to the passage of legal protections, such as s. 230 of
Communications Decency Act in the United States,80 which in turn allowed the
level of scalability achieved by giant online platforms. Canadian law is more
complex with regard to intermediary liability. Although online service providers
are granted immunity from liability for intellectual property infringing activities
of their users as a result of their participation in the ‘‘Notice and Notice”
procedure,81 some courts have been willing to find liability for third-party
78 Michael Karanicolas et al., supra note 14 at 26.
79 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of
opinion and expression,U.N.H.R.C., 17th Sess.,U.N.Doc.A/HRC/17/27 (2011) at para.
44, online: <www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/17session/
A.HRC.17.27_en.pdf>.
80 47 U.S.C. § 230 (1996).
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material under other areas of law.82 However, where defamation is concerned,
intermediaries are able to benefit from an ‘‘innocent dissemination” defence,83
and more generally, enforcement actions for criminal conduct tend to focus on
the party directly responsible for creating the material, rather than the
intermediary, unless there is some evidence of intent or knowledge on the part
of the latter.84
In the aftermath of the 2016 election interference scandals, significant global
attention focused on the role of the platforms, and particularly Facebook and
Twitter, in disseminating online misinformation.85 This new and unwanted
attention further elevated intense pressure that platforms face from governments
around the world to act against speech which is deemed objectionable,86 from
ISIS and al-Qaeda-related material87 to ‘‘disrespectful” photos of the King of
Thailand.88 But while some of these restrictions have come in the form of new
binding regulations,89 or judicial orders mandating that particular content be
removed, a parallel trend has been to pressure platforms to amend their own
content policies to address speech which governments find problematic, shifting
direct enforcement decisions over to these private sector actors.
This practice, sometimes referred to as ‘‘jawboning” or moral suasion,
involves the application of pressure through informal threats of regulation as
opposed to issuing formal and legally binding orders.90 In other words, rather
than ordering a platform to take action against a particular webpage or post,
81 Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-42, s. 31.1.
82 See e.g. Carter v. B.C. Federation of Foster Parents Assn., 2005 BCCA 398, 2005
CarswellBC 1854 (B.C. C.A.).
83 Crookes v. Wikimedia Foundation Inc., 2011 SCC 47, 2011 CarswellBC 2627, 2011
CarswellBC 2628 (S.C.C.).
84 CoreyOmer, ‘‘IntermediaryLiability forHarmful Speech:Lessons fromAbroad” (2014)
28:1 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 289 at 305-308.
85 See e.g. RobFaris et al., ‘‘Partisanship, Propaganda, andDisinformation: OnlineMedia
and the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election” Berkman Klein Center for Internet & Society
Research Paper (16 August 2017), online: <papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstrac-
t_id=3019414>.
86 Kate Klonick, ‘‘The New Governors: The People, Rules, and Processes Governing
Online Speech” (2019) 131:6 Harv. L. Rev. 1598 at 1623.
87 U.K., Secretary of State for Digital, Culture,Media & Sport & the Secretary of State for
the Home Department, Online Harms White Paper (April 2019), online: <assets.pu-
blishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/
793360/Online_Harms_White_Paper.pdf>.
88 AndrewGriffin, ‘‘FacebookBlocks Video of Thailand’sKingWearing aCropTop” The
Independent (11 May 2017), online: <www.independent.co.uk/life-style/gadgets-and-
tech/news/facebook-thailand-king-thai-video-crop-top-bodindradebayavarangkun-
maha-vajiralongkorn-a7729886.html>.
89 See e.g. Germany, The Network Enforcement Act, 30 June 2017, in force of 1 October
2017, Federal Law Gazette 2017 I, No. 61, p 3352 ff.
90 Bambauer, supra note 8 at 57.
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senior government officials will make public statements expressing displeasure
with a particular type of content emanating from platforms, and warn that, if
nothing is done to address the problem voluntarily, they will pass costly and
restrictive new laws to bring the companies to heel.
This approach can be highly effective, since it taps into platforms’ desire to
get ahead of potential government regulation, which is riskier and less
predictable than an internally managed policy-shift.91 From the government’s
perspective, it also neatly sidesteps any potential legal or political challenges that
might stand in the way of getting effective legislation through. Governments who
face internal or public resistance to passing a particular kind of law, for example,
might nonetheless be able to achieve their desired results by bluffing that new
legislation is just over the horizon.
None of this is to suggest that jawboning is always a negative thing. The use
of informal pressure to push companies into being more responsible is a well-
established regulatory strategy, which has achieved varying levels of success
across a number of different industries, and often to the public benefit.92
However, in the context of restrictions on speech, this tactic can be problematic,
insofar as it removes any opportunity to question whether the new rules are
consistent with bedrock freedom of expression principles, since traditional
avenues of judicial appeal do not apply in the same way to private sector
enforcement decisions. Similarly, if the new restrictions are unpopular, the public
is denied a meaningful opportunity to express their displeasure at the ballot box.
There is rarely a clear and visible line which connects private sector policy shifts
to the government’s complaints. While this dynamic is characteristic of all
jawboning campaigns, since they present a fuzzier target for opposition than the
passage of new legislation, the politically sensitive nature of restrictions on
speech, and the centrality of freedom of expression to the political process, mean
that it is particularly concerning in this context.
To understand why the dynamic of private sector enforcement is so
problematic, consider the case of South Korea, where content decisions originate
from the Korea Communications Standards Commission (KCSC), an
administrative body whose members are appointed by the President.93 The
KCSC is notoriously heavy handed, and frequently targets sites which criticize
politicians, or challenge sensitive policy areas.94 Their decisions are issued to the
91 Daphne Keller, ‘‘Who Do You Sue? State and Platform Hybrid Power Over Online
Speech” Aegis Series Paper No. 1902 (29 January 2019) at 2, online: <www.lawfar-
eblog.com/who-do-you-sue-state-and-platform-hybrid-power-over-online-speech>.
92 See e.g. Ronald W. Cotterill, ‘‘Jawboning Cereal: The Campaign to Lower Cereal
Prices” (1999) 15:2 Agribusiness 197.
93 Daeho Kim, ‘‘New Regulatory Institution for the Convergence of Broadcasting and
Telecommunications: A Korean Case” (2011) 28:2 Government Information Quarterly
155.
94 Kyung Sin Park, ‘‘Administrative Internet Censorship by Korea Communication
Standards Commission“ (2015) 33 Soongsil L. Rev. 91.
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platforms, rather than to the users who post the material, and come in the form
of non-binding requests for removal. Weak intermediary liability protections
mean that, in practice, these requests are followed, virtually 100% of the time.
However, the fact that the decisions are not formally binding means that,
technically, enforcement originates from the platform, rather than the KCSC,
which strips users of any procedural safeguards, such as a notification that their
material is subject to removal. Crucially, it also takes away any right of appeal,
or an ability to judicially challenge the removal, the way they might if the
deletion had flowed directly from a government order. Constitutional questions
are avoided since, technically, this is not a State enforcement action, but rather
an autonomous decision being made by a private sector entity.
B. Canadian Jawboning
Jawboning as a regulatory strategy has become particularly commonplace in
the realm of online speech.95 However, in May 2019 two events took place which
appeared to mark Canada’s embrace of this as a mechanism for pushing for
privatized content controls in the realm of online political speech. First, on May
21, Canada unveiled its ‘‘Digital Charter,” a set of principles which are meant to
guide the national approach to the digital and data economy.96 Included among
these principles is a statement that the government ‘‘will defend freedom of
expression and protect against online threats and disinformation designed to
undermine the integrity of elections and democratic institutions.”97 However,
when one navigates to the Digital Charter’s more specific action areas, including
proposed legislative changes, the response to disinformation is listed under the
heading ‘‘Expecting social media platforms to act.”98
The main component included under this heading is the ‘‘Canada
Declaration on Electoral Integrity Online,” which spells out a number of
responsibilities that the government is attaching to social media platforms, such
as removing fake accounts and ‘‘inauthentic content,” intensifying efforts to
combat disinformation, and assisting users ‘‘to better understand the sources of
information they are seeing.”99
95 See e.g. Liat Clark, ‘‘Facebook and Twitter Must Tackle Hate Speech or Face New
Laws” Wired (5 December 2016), online: <www.wired.co.uk/article/us-tech-giants-
must-tackle-hate-speech-or-face-legal-action>.
96 Canada, Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada, Canada’s Digital
Charter: Trust in aDigitalWorld (Ottawa: ISEDCanada, 2019), online:<www.ic.gc.ca/
eic/site/062.nsf/eng/h_00108.html>.
97 Ibid.
98 Canada, Minister of Democratic Institutions, Protecting Democracy (Ottawa: Govern-
ment of Canada, 2019), online: <www.canada.ca/en/democratic-institutions/services/
protecting-democracy.html>.
99 Canada,Minister of Democratic Institutions, Canada Declaration on Electoral Integrity
Online (Ottawa: Government of Canada, 2019), online: <www.canada.ca/en/demo-
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In typical jawboning fashion, while these ‘‘obligations” are not backed by
any specific legal requirement or powers of enforcement, senior government
officials, and particularly Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, were explicit in stating
that platforms which failed to adequately take action along the specified lines
would face ‘‘meaningful financial consequences.”100 Driving the point home on
Twitter, the Prime Minister’s announcement of the Digital Charter specifically
singled out this aspect: ‘‘Social media platforms must be held accountable for the
hate speech & disinformation we see online — and if they don’t step up, there will
be consequences.”101
A week after the Digital Charter was unveiled, fromMay 27-29, the House of
Commons Standing Committee on Access to Information, Privacy and Ethics
hosted the ‘‘International Grand Committee on Big Data, Privacy and
Democracy.”102 The meeting included delegates from the United Kingdom,
Singapore, Ireland, Germany, Estonia, Mexico, Morocco, Ecuador, Costa Rica,
and Saint Lucia. It also included witnesses representing various stakeholders,
including from a number of prominent tech companies.
Media coverage of the meetings focused largely on the failure of Mark
Zuckerberg and Sheryl Sandberg to appear, and the subsequent decision by
Canadian MPs to issue a summons for the two executives.103 But while the
legislators’ opprobrium over the perceived snub is somewhat understandable, the
broader tone of the conversations, and the apparent willingness of Canadian
lawmakers to consider far more intrusive actions to bring the tech companies to
heel, is vastly more significant from a policy perspective. Particularly concerning
was the fact that, immediately preceding the meeting with representatives from
the platforms, discussions with individual witnesses that had been invited by the
Committee included a strong focus on imposing blanket shutdowns on social
media, with Sri Lanka’s decision to block all social media in the aftermath of a
series of church bombings104 being pointed to as an example to follow:
cratic-institutions/services/protecting-democracy/declaration-electoral-integri-
ty.html>.
100 ‘‘Trudeau warns of ’meaningful financial consequences’ for social media giants that
don’t combat hate speech” Canadian Press (16 May 2019), online: CBC<www.cbc.ca/
news/politics/digital-charter-trudeau-1.5138194>.
101 Justin Trudeau, ‘‘Social media platformsmust be held accountable for the hate speech&
disinformation we see online— and if they don’t step up, there will be consequences.We
launchedCanada’s newDigital Charter today to guide our decisions, learnmore about it
here: bit.ly/2YGiTuu” (21 May 2019 at 16:08), online: Twitter <twitter.com/Justin-
Trudeau/status/1130913223178432518>.
102 See House of Commons, Standing Committee on Access to Information, Privacy and
Ethics, Evidence, 1st Sess., 42nd Parl., Nos. 151-155 (27-29 May 2019).
103 Alexander Panetta & Nancy Scola, ‘‘Facebook’s Zuckerberg Faces Summons After
Snubbing Canada” Politico (5 May 2019), online: <www.politico.com/story/2019/05/
28/canada-facebook-mark-zuckerberg-1475782>.
104 Hannah Ellis-Petersen, ‘‘Social Media Shut Down in Sri Lanka in Bid to Stem
Misinformation” The Guardian (22 April 2019), online: <www.theguardian.com/
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At the end of the day, though, the most effective path to reform would
be to shut down the platforms at least temporarily, as Sri Lanka did.
Any country can go first. The platforms have left you no choice. The
time has come to call their bluff. Companies with responsible business
models will emerge overnight to fill the void.105
Social media shutdowns, of the kind being advocated here, are
internationally recognized as a gross violation of the right to freedom of
expression.106 But although the idea of imposing a blanket social media ban
received some pushback, particularly from European representatives on the
Grand Committee,107 it was eagerly embraced by representatives from
Singapore,108 which recently passed its own extremely repressive bill regulating
‘‘online falsehoods.”109 While the Canadians on the Committee did not,
explicitly, endorse social media shutdowns, they also did not push back
against the idea.
The broader tone of the conversation found them standing shoulder-to-
shoulder with Singapore, and other governments with a chequered record on
freedom of expression. Discussing a recent decision by Facebook not to delete a
manipulated video of United States Speaker of the House of Representatives
Nancy Pelosi, and instead to label it as false and suppress its spread, Peter Kent,
the Member of Parliament from Thornhill, opined that ‘‘it would seem that
Facebook is refusing to remove this politically hostile video, claiming a sort of
perverted defence claim of free speech.”110 Peter Kent followed up by expressing
his displeasure at the thought that videos of that type could be disseminated
world/2019/apr/21/social-media-shut-down-in-sri-lanka-in-bid-to-stem-misinforma-
tion>.
105 House ofCommons, StandingCommittee onAccess to Information, Privacy andEthics,
Evidence, 1st Sess., 42nd Parl., No. 152 (28 May 2019) at 0840 (Roger McNamee).
106 Joint Declaration on Freedom of Expression and the Internet, signed by the U.N. Special
Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and Expression, O.S.C.E. Representative on
Freedom of the Media, O.A.S. Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression &
A.C.H.P.R. Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression and Access to Information
(1 June 2011) at para. 6(b), online: <www.oas.org/en/iachr/expression/showarticle.as-
p?artID=849&lID=1>.
107 House ofCommons, StandingCommittee onAccess to Information, Privacy andEthics,
International Grand Committee on Big Data, Privacy and Democracy, 42-1, No 152 (28
May 2019) at 0935 & 0940 (Jens Zimmermann & Keit Pentus-Rosimannus).
108 House ofCommons, StandingCommittee onAccess to Information, Privacy andEthics,
International Grand Committee on Big Data, Privacy and Democracy, 42-1, No 152 (28
May 2019) at 0930 (Edwin Tong).
109 Protection from Online Falsehoods and Manipulation Act (Singapore) 2019/10, online:
Parliament of Singapore <www.parliament.gov.sg/docs/default-source/default-docu-
ment-library/protection-from-online-falsehoods-and-manipulation-bill10-2019.pdf>.
For a discussion of the problems with this law, from a human rights perspective, see e.g.
“Singapore fake news law a ’disaster’ for freedom of speech, says rights group,” The
Guardian (9 May 2019), online: <www.theguardian.com/world/2019/may/09/singa-
pore-fake-news-law-a-disaster-for-freedom-of-speech-says-rights-group>.
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about Canadian politicians, before explicitly threatening the company: ‘‘Are you
aware that, in democracies around the world, you are coming closer and closer to
facing antitrust action?”111
It is worth emphasizing that the video in question would unequivocally be
legal to disseminate under Canadian law, even with the broadest possible
interpretation of the revised s. 91 of the Canada Elections Act. This is for good
reason. While it is easy to point to this piece of content, which manipulated video
of the Speaker to suggest that she was drunk, as an example of misinformation
which should be addressed, it is vastly more difficult to come up with a consistent
rule that would prohibit the creation or distribution of this video while still
allowing room for creations that constitute legitimate political satire. For
example, it has become popular online to mock U.S. President Donald Trump’s
staid legislative signing ceremonies by inserting crude or child-like drawings in
place of the text of the bill.112 Indeed, just a month after his comments at the
Grand Committee, Mr. Kent’s own Conservative Party faced criticism for
uploading its own manipulated photo of Prime Minister Justin Trudeau.113
Beyond the challenge of defining the scope of the problem, a particularly
telling aspect of Peter Kent’s statement was the conflation of content moderation
structures with questions around antitrust. Competition and antitrust questions
were a common feature of the discussion at the Grand Committee, often posed
alongside concerns related to content moderation, as well as related to
privacy.114 Arguments that the platforms are wielding their power
irresponsibly, or in a manner which is detrimental to the public interest, can,
in some contexts, be relevant to a competition inquiry.115 However, while there
are certainly legitimate concerns around the market dominance that major
platforms wield, particularly Facebook and particularly in certain countries in
the global south, the obvious impetus for legislators to push these issues together
is because competition law is a heavier cudgel to wield, with far more substantial
legal and financial consequences. It is troubling to see the utilization of a legal
framework, whose purpose is to promote core economic goals and support
110 House ofCommons, StandingCommittee onAccess to Information, Privacy andEthics,
Evidence, 1st Sess., 42nd Parl., No. 153 (28 May 2019) at 1225 (Hon. Peter Kent).
111 Ibid. at 1230 (Hon. Peter Kent).
112 MarkMalloy, ‘‘DonaldTrumpSigningExecutiveOrderPhotoSparksHilariousMeme”
The Telegraph (3 February 2017), online: <www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/02/01/
donald-trump-signing-executive-order-photo-sparks-hilarious/>.
113 Emma McIntosh, ‘‘Don’t Read Into Darker-Skinned Trudeau Image, Conservatives
Insist” National Observer (28 June 2019), online: <www.nationalobserver.com/2019/
06/27/news/dont-read-darker-skinned-trudeau-image-conservatives-insist>.
114 See e.g. House of Commons, Standing Committee on Access to Information, Privacy
and Ethics, Evidence, 1st Sess., 42nd Parl., No. 153 (28 May 2019) at 1115 (Nathaniel
Erskine-Smith).
115 See e.g. Australia, Competition and Consumer Act 2010, 1974/51, s. 44X(1)(b), online:
<www.legislation.gov.au/Details/C2017C00369>.
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market competition and consumer choice,116 being used to push extra-legal
action on regulating speech.
At the conclusion of the session, the participants in the Grand Committee
signed a joint declaration. While much of the language is relatively benign, such
as commitments to strengthen privacy rights and data protection, it also includes
a line suggesting that ‘‘measures should be imposed on social media platforms to
prevent digital activities that threaten social peace.”117 That language
conspicuously draws the line for intervention far beyond the sorts of legal
restrictions which might pass muster under Canada’s Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms.118 Indeed, it bears more of a resemblance to Chinese
governmental approaches, which emphasize collective harmony over individual
rights, than it does to traditional liberal democratic regulatory standards.119
While it is important not to read too much into the specific use of the phrase
‘‘social peace” considering the give and take that accompanies the drafting of
these joint statements, it is nonetheless troubling to see Canada acquiescing to
this hazier definition of the problem, particularly given the government’s
position as the host for this particular session.
7. WHY DO WE HAVE A CONSTITUTION?
The contextual importance of political speech to our democratic system
requires, simultaneously, the greatest measure of deference to airing a diversity of
views, and the greatest care to safeguard against manipulation. This is an
incredibly delicate balance, and it is among the trickiest areas to define in terms
of the contours of prohibited speech.120 Novel challenges related to jurisdiction
and enforcement of online speech restrictions, and the emergent weaponization
of social media as a vector for foreign intelligence operations, add significant new
complications to an already fraught regulatory space.
116 Competition Act, S.C. 1985, c. C-34, s 1.1.
117 Ottawa Declaration, International Grand Committee on Big Data, Privacy and
Democracy (28 May 2019) available in House of Commons, Standing Committee on
Access to Information, Privacy and Ethics, International Grand Committee on Big Data,
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<www.ourcommons.ca/Content/Committee/421/ETHI/Reports/RP10583356/
ethirp20/ethirp20-e.pdf>.
118 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c 11.
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However, there are good reasons why, unlike hate speech and defamation,
which are both well-recognized as areas where relatively robust limits on speech
may be justified, international human rights standards have always viewed laws
targeting ‘‘fake news” with suspicion.121 The drift in how the term has been
employed by U.S. President Donald Trump, ultimately to refer to any
information which contradicts his own personal narrative, is well illustrative of
the problem with allowing governments, or any authority, to dictate a centralized
version of the truth, a power which is implicit in the enforcement of
misinformation rules.122 Abuses of ‘‘fake news” legislation in places like Egypt
show precisely why our constitutional rules outlining how and when our
government may curtail speech are so important.123
Obviously, Canada is not Egypt, and there is a clear difference between
jailing those accused of spreading misinformation and merely working to
suppress particular content. However, the latter measure can still be a severe
interference with the right to freedom of expression, especially where carried out
in the context of an election. Although Canada has a robust system of
constitutional oversight, it is troubling that, while both of the approaches
discussed in this paper have the potential to substantially impact the right to
freedom of expression, neither approach has been seriously evaluated in terms of
its impacts on s. 2(b) of the Charter. There is no judicial remedy to a moderation
decision taken ‘‘independently” by a platform according to its own content
guidelines, even if these guidelines have been drafted, and are being enforced, as a
result of direct pressure, and even overt threats, from the Canadian government.
In terms of the new “fake news” provisions in the Canada Elections Act, it is
important to bear in mind that, even without direct enforcement, overbroad
restrictions on expression can have a substantial chilling effect on legitimate
speech. This is particularly true, where the rules are vague or broadly drawn, as
the new restrictions in s. 91 certainly are.124
None of this is to discount the challenge in combating misinformation,
particularly given its potential for weaponization by foreign governments. But
given that a major goal of State-orchestrated disinformation attacks is to
undermine democracy,125 it seems self-defeating if, in our efforts to safeguard
121 Joint Declaration on Freedom of Expression and ‘‘Fake News,” Disinformation And
Propaganda, declaration by the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and
Expression, O.S.C.E. Representative on Freedom of the Media, O.A.S. Special
Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression & the A.C.H.P.R. Special Rapporteur on
Freedom of Expression and Access to Information (3 March 2017), online: <www.oa-
s.org/en/iachr/expression/showarticle.asp?artID=1056&lID=1>.
122 TamaraKeith, ‘‘President Trump’sDescription ofWhat’s ’Fake’ Is Expanding”NPR (2
September 2018), online: <www.npr.org/2018/09/02/643761979/president-trumps-de-
scription-of-whats-fake-is-expanding>.
123 ‘‘Egypt: Activists Arrested inDawnRaids”HumanRightsWatch (31May 2018), online:
<www.hrw.org/news/2018/05/31/egypt-activists-arrested-dawn-raids>.
124 General Comment No. 34: Article 19 (Freedoms of opinion and expression), supra note 30
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our elections, we sidestep the constitutional structure which is at the core of our
system of government. Constitutional democracy is not just about cleaving to the
letter of the law, but also about working within the spirit of it. This means, in
part, having a government whose regulatory approach respects the
constitutionally established contours of protected speech, rather than seeking
novel avenues to suppress speech which is not illegal.
This need not tie the government’s hands in seeking to counter the threat of
online misinformation. Indeed, there are a number of potential responses which
are not inconsistent with Canada’s constitutional principles, some of which are
already incorporated into the Elections Modernization Act. These include, for
example, moves to enhance transparency in political advertising, allowing people
to see past the customized version of a message they are being offered.126
Algorithmic transparency, which was also discussed at the International Grand
Committee on Big Data, Privacy and Democracy,127 could be another area of
regulation, in order to help voters understand the machinations behind why they
are being exposed to particular kinds of advertising or content on social media,
and potentially smell for themselves whether there is manipulation afoot.
Greater support for fact-checking, and even for traditional journalism, is
another important response which the government is already pursuing.128 These
initiatives seem far more in line with the broader approach of the Supreme Court
in Thomson Newspapers Co., with respect to its presumption that the Canadian
voter is a rational, mature and intelligent actor,129 and in Bryan, with regard to
the need to promote informational equality.130
Canada also has constitutionally-tested legal solutions already on the books
to combat problematic speech, such as our hate speech and defamation laws, as
well as laws targeting harassment and violent speech. While there may be scaling
challenges in dealing with these types of content in an online context, these could
nonetheless be used to target particularly meddlesome or egregious strains of
election interference, as these often overlap with more well-established categories
of prohibited speech.
None of these potential responses is a silver bullet. However, it is worth
noting that, at the moment, we also have no evidence that existing measures are
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November 2018), 2018:7 Berkman Klein Center for Internet & Society, online:
<papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3273111>.
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127 House ofCommons, StandingCommittee onAccess to Information, Privacy andEthics,
Evidence, 1st Sess., 42nd Parl., No. 153 (28 May 2019) at 1250 (Nathaniel Erskine-
Smith).
128 Canada,Department of Finance, Investing inMiddle Class Jobs (Ottawa:Department of
Finance, 2018) at 40, online:<www.budget.gc.ca/fes-eea/2018/docs/statement-enonce/
fes-eea-2018-eng.pdf>.
129 Thomson Newspapers, supra note 54 at paras. 101, 112.
130 Bryan, supra note 22 at paras. 35, 62.
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insufficient to deal with the threat that Canada faces. While there is no question
that the danger of election interference via misinformation exists, Canada has
counter-measures that were not available in the British or American context in
2016. One significant advantage is the Canadian public’s general awareness of
this threat, as a result of the widespread media coverage of the 2016 campaigns of
interference. At the very least, it seems reasonable, in this context, to verify that
Canada’s current constitutional framework for regulating election speech is
inadequate to safeguard our democratic process before we explore approaches
that circumvent this formula.
8. CONCLUSION
In the evening session of the International Grand Committee on Big Data,
Privacy and Democracy, which followed the platforms’ own session, an
illuminating exchange took place when Joseph Cannataci, the United Nations
Special Rapporteur on the right to privacy, was asked for examples of countries
which, in his opinion, could be looked to as a best practice in terms of election
law.131 The Special Rapporteur responded that he could not think of any such
instances. It is a problem which, as of yet, no country has really been able to get
right. In part, the global embrace of jawboning, and the desire to outsource the
problem to private sector platforms, is born out of this common frustration.
Canada’s response should remain grounded in constitutional and human
rights-based approaches which, while addressing the challenge, nonetheless stay
true to our core commitment to robust freedom of expression, particularly in the
political arena. Staying true to these principles is particularly important in light
of broader global backsliding in the freedom of expression space, including
among well-established democracies, like Australia and the United States.132 In
the absence of a strong model which safeguards expressive rights, countries
which prize order and control over liberal democratic individual freedom will be
eager to fill the void.
A departure from these values, even in the face of a real and substantial
threat, presents challenges that cut to the heart of our democracy. Respect for
our democratic institutions is, somewhat circularly, heavily derivative of the fact
that governments across Canada respect and adhere to them. Our political
system, and indeed every political system, relies enormously on precedent.
This is a fragile state of affairs. If a particular problem can be resolved
through means that subvert our core constitutional values, there is every reason
to expect that the government will employ the same approach to address other
131 House ofCommons, StandingCommittee onAccess to Information, Privacy andEthics,
Evidence, 1st Sess., 42nd Parl., No. 154 (28 May 2019) at 1715 (Jo Stevens).
132 Christopher Brandt et al., Democracy in Retreat: Freedom in the World 2019 (Freedom
House, 2019), online:<freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2019/
democracy-in-retreat>.
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pressing issues. Rather than going down this path, Canadian democracy would
be best served by cleaving to the spirit and letter of our Charter values.
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